From Worker\u27s State to Work without Pay: Labor Law Reform in the Russian Federation by Holmes, C. Scott
NORTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
COMMERCIAL REGULATION
Volume 23 | Number 2 Article 4
Winter 1998
From Worker's State to Work without Pay: Labor
Law Reform in the Russian Federation
C. Scott Holmes
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North
Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
C. S. Holmes, From Worker's State to Work without Pay: Labor Law Reform in the Russian Federation, 23 N.C. J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg.
341 (1997).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj/vol23/iss2/4
From Worker's State to Work without Pay: Labor Law Reform in the
Russian Federation
Cover Page Footnote
International Law; Commercial Law; Law
This comments is available in North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation:
http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj/vol23/iss2/4
COMMENT
From Workers' State to Work Without Pay:
Labor Law Reform in the Russian Federation
I. Introduction
On March 28, 1997, almost two million Russian workers,
joined by retirees, walked off their jobs in protest of unpaid wages
and pensions.' Many workers had not been paid in months.2
Communist party members joined the workers in the streets of
hundreds of cities and towns to protest the economic reforms of
the Yeltsin administration.3 President Yeltsin responded with
more promises to pay and with praises for the protesters' "orderly
behavior."4 The ex-official union of the Soviet era, the Federation
of Independent Trade Unions of Russia (FNPR), estimated that
over twenty million workers would protest Yeltsin's failure to
fulfill promises to compensate workers Managers and employers
joined the union in protesting government economic reforms that
Russia's Interior Ministry estimated that 1.8 million people participated in
demonstrations in nearly 1,300 cities nationwide. But it was only a fraction of
the 17 million strikers that labor leaders had expected to join the one-day strike
against President Boris N. Yeltsin's government, which has not made good on
promises to pay $8.8 billion in wage and pension arrears.
Clara Germani, Thousands of Russians Strike for Back Wages; One-day National
Walkout Fails to Draw 10 Million Predicted by Unions, BALTIMORE SUN, Mar. 28, 1997,
at 12A.
2 See Protesters in Russia Seek Unpaid Wages, Pensions, WALL ST. J., Mar. 28,
1997, at A12.
3 See Yeltsin Acknowledges Strikers' Demands, Promises Help, Dow JONES INT'L
NEWS SERV., Mar. 28, 1997, at 8:10:00.
4 See id.
5 See Mike Trickey, Russia Braces for Huge Strike, CALGARY HERALD, Mar. 26,
1997, at Al 5; see also Peter Ford, Unpaid Russians Take to Streets to Shout 'Show me
the Rubles, CMUSTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 28, 1997, at 1; Maxim Zhukov, To Bid Up
Its Price on March 27, RuSS. PRESS DIG., Mar. 20, 1997, available in 1997 WL
7804895.
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have created a climate of economic crisis.6  Furthermore,
throughout 1997, isolated strikes occurred across Russia.7
The recent strike in Russia indicates the depth and breadth of
economic despair in Russia. In addition to employees working
without pay, many workers have lost their jobs in mass discharges,
reducing "redundancy" in formerly State owned enterprises.8 The
strike activity shows that labor relations are still conducted at the
national level rather than the enterprise level. The alliance
between the FNPR and management, which characterized the
Soviet regime, surfaces again in this strike as management joined
unions in their protest.9 The presence of Communists at the
demonstration also indicates that the FNPR may still be associated
with the totalitarian politics of the past, rather than representing
worker interests in the present."
Tracing the development of trade unions in Russian law, this
Comment will explore the Russian Federation's (RF) struggle to
move from an ideological workers' State to a constitutional,
6 As is common knowledge, a tripartite agreement between employers, unions
and the Government is observed in the country, each of the sides to which has
assumed definite commitments for the period of market reforms. It can be easily
guessed that the Government is the side which flouts its commitments the most,
says the paper. This fact prompted the employers and unions to send a separate
appeal the other day to President Yeltsin as the actual head of the third party to
the agreement. The appeal says in part that "the massive violations of the
worker rights are in many respects foreshadowed by factors outside the sphere
of labor relations, which are directly linked to the destructive consequences of
the sole course of economic reforms, conducted by the Government of the
Russian Federation."
Alexander Zhelenin, Unions and Employers Appeal to Yeltsin, Russ. PRESS DIG., Mar.
14, 1997, available in 1997 WL 7804830.
7 For example, miners struck in the Far East, six thousand workers struck at the
Yantar shipyard, and medical workers struck across Russia, dozens of whom
participated in a hunger strike. See id; see also Sakhalin Doctors on Hunger Strike,
BIZEKON NEWS, Feb. 15, 1997, available in 1997 WL 7801479.
8 See Vladimir Gerchikov, Russia, in LABOR RELATIONS & POLITICAL CHANGE IN
EASTERN EUROPE: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 137, 149 (John Thirkell et al. eds.,
1995).
9 "The demonstration here was organized by both union leaders and plant
management--a co-existence that is a. throwback to Soviet times when labor unions
were just social services groups for each industrial sector." Germani, supra note 1, at
12A.
10 See id.
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market culture governed by the "rule of law." This history helps
explain why labor relations are still a national issue, why the
national union would be politically allied with communists, and
why the union is economically allied with management. By
analyzing the development of trade unions in Russian law, this
Comment will illustrate that recent labor legislation does not
address the current economic reality of Russia.
This Comment also raises broader jurisprudence questions
regarding the legal foundation of state legitimacy and practical
questions about the relation between economics and law. When a
state is founded on an ideological economic premise, and then that
premise is rejected, what is left of legitimate state rule? In
particular, what happens to the legal and cultural status of work
when the ideological premise of the worker State is overturned?
Part II of this Comment describes the ideological conceptions
of Soviet labor law and trade unions as an instrument of Party
action." After summarizing the break down of ideological rule
under perestroika,2 Part EI analyzes recent labor law reforms as
compared to the United States and International Labor
Organization standards. 3 This Comment concludes by speculating
on the difficulties the Russian Federation faces in the
establishment of "the rule of law" in a free labor market. 4
II. Ideology, Labor and the Law in the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics
With the success of the Bolshevik coup d'etat in 1917,
Vladmir Lenin and Leon Trotsky introduced a new kind of state
rule. 5 Gone was the Tsar,6 overthrown was the democratic
I" See infra notes 15-81 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 82-113 and accompanying text.
'3 See infra notes 114-88 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 188-2 10 and accompanying text.
15 See ROBERT E. KERBER ET AL., WESTERN CMLIZATIONS: THEIR HISTORY AND
THEIR CuLTuRE 953 (11th ed. 1988). The "October Revolution" established the All-
Russian Congress of Soviets and marked the beginning of an eight-year long civil war
among the Bolsheviks (Reds) and a coalition of democrats, Tsarists, peasants, and
foreign interventionists (Whites). See id. at 972.
16 The Tsar Nicholas I1 and his family were killed in July 1918. See id. at 972-73.
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Provisional Government, 7 and in their place was the Party." In
leading this revolution, Lenin adapted Marxist theories of
historical and economic development to the agrarian Russian
context." Like Marx, Lenin felt that history is driven by
successive modes of exploitation in which the exploiters control
the means of production and accumulate wealth at the expense of
the exploited.2" Those who control production gain control of the
State, and laws become "tools" of the exploiting class.2' Thus, as
the number of exploited workers increase, these workers would
begin to recognize the class conflict inherent in the private control
over production and would unite to overthrow the exploiters.22
Workers with equal control over the means of production would
end class conflict and the State would eventually "wither away.,
23
17 Alexander Kerensky, a moderate socialist democrat, established the Provisional
Government in March 1917 after forcing the abdication of the Tsar. See id. at 952.
18 See generally DAVID MCCLELLAN, MARXISM AFTER MARX 86-87 (1979)
(discussing Lenin and his philosophy).
19 Promising "Peace, Bread, and Land," the Bolsheviks rapidly partitioned the land
for peasants, nationalized banks, and gave factory control over to workers. See id. at
953.
20 See generally KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO
57-58 (Samuel Moore trans., Joseph Katz ed., Pocket Books 1964) (1848).
The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles.
Freeman and slave, patrician and plebian, lord and serf, guildmaster and
journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed stood in constant opposition to
one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight
that each time ended, either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large,
or in the common ruin of the struggling classes.
Id.
21 See KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, THE GERMAN IDEOLOGY 80 (C.J. Arthur
ed., 1970) (1846).
Since the State is the form in which the individuals of a ruling class assert their
common interests, and in which the whole civil society of an epoch is
epitomised, it follows that the State mediates in the formation of all common
institutions and that institutions receive a political form.
Id. "[L]egal relationships (and, consequently, law itself) are rooted in the material
conditions of life, and [the] law is merely the will of the dominant class, elevated into a
statute." Andrei Y. Vyshinsky, The Foundations of the Marxist-Leninist Theory of State
and Law, in RUSSIAN LEGAL THEORY 321, 329 (W.E. Butler ed., 1996).
22 See MARX & ENGELS, supra note 20, at 115-16.
23 Id. at 94-95.
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However, instead of a spontaneous and universal revolution
envisioned by Marx,24 Lenin believed that workers could not
recognize class conflict while they were exploited. As such,
workers needed a group of highly organized professionals, the
"Vanguard," to raise their consciousness and lead the revolution.2
Justified by this view of the historical process and the role of the
State in exploitation,26 the Vanguard seized control of production
by force, and dismantled the political and legal institutions which
dominated workers.27 Ultimately the workers would be self-
employed and self-governed with the State as their instrument of
economic and political power. 8 This international revolutionary
movement would eventually create a state of perfect equality
where laws would be unnecessary.2
24 See id. at 74-75.
25 See 'VLADMIR 1. LENIN, WHAT IS TO BE DONE? BURNING QUESTIONS OF OUR
MOVEMENT 82-83 (Joe Fineberg & George Hanna trans., Victor J. Jerome ed., New
York International Publishers 1969) (1902). According to Lenin, the correct class
consciousness cannot be gained by the worker spontaneously in reaction to immediate
economic needs. Rather, the "Vanguard" must educate and guide workers in a total
vision of all class relations and must not participate in the political and economic
reforms of the trade unions. To Lenin, the trade unions sell out worker short-term
interest for the unions' own preservation in relation to the State and management. See
id. at 35-44, 54-64.
26 See MCCLELLAN, supra note 18, at 86-87 (stating that "professional
revolutioharies" are required to raise class consciousness among the proletariat because
"the proletariat, left to itself, would inevitably follow bourgeoisie ideology").
27 Lenin envisioned that the Vanguard of the proletariat, the Party, would assume
state power and would lead "the whole people to Socialism." Id. In the process,
workers will organise large-scale production on the basis of what capitalism has
already created, relying on [their] own experience as workers, establishing
strict, iron discipline backed up by State power of the armed workers; [they]
will reduce the role of the state officials to that of simply carrying out [their]
instructions as responsible, revocable, modestly paid "foremen and
accountants."
Id.
28 See Andrei A. Baev, The Transformation of the Role of the State in Monitoring
Large Firms in Russia: From the State's Supervision to the State's Fiduciary Duties, 8
TRANSNAT'L LAw. 247, 253 (1995). "[A]ccording to official Soviet ideology, labor is
not viewed as a commodity. Workers are not exploited, since there is no private capital
and the Soviet state, being 'the state of the whole people,' is not considered an
employer." Id.
29 See MARx & ENGELS, supra note 20, at 95.
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Lenin considered law an instrument of the revolution,
incidental to the Party's control of the State.3" A Leninist
ideological conception of the law considered all legal relationships
as "a form of the relationships between egoistic and isolated
subjects, bearing autonomous private interests as commodity
owners."'" The end of class conflict corresponds to "the general
withering away of the legal superstructure;"32 thus, progress
toward justice diminishes the role of law, the State and the Party.33
Stalin saw things differently.34 His nationalistic totalitarianism
subverted the ideological goals of Lenin and the first generation of
If the proletariat during its contest with the bourgeoisie is compelled, by the
force of circumstances, to organize itself as a class, if, by means of a revolution,
it makes itself the ruling class, and, as such, sweeps away by force the old
conditions of production, then it will, along with these conditions, have swept
away the conditions for the existence of class antagonisms and of classes
generally, and will thereby have abolished its own supremacy as a class. In
place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class antagonisms, we
shall have an association in which the free development of each is the condition
for the free development of all.
Id. at 95 (emphasis added).
30 The view of the law under Lenin's ideological application of Marx's theory can
be characterized as "instrumentalism." See KATHRYN HENDLEY, TRYING TO MAKE LAW
MATTER: LEGAL REFORM AND LABOR LAW IN 'THE SOVIET UNION 18-19 (1996)
[hereinafter TRYING TO MAKE LAW MATTER]. For example, newly created institutions
and "revolutionary courts" were "instructed to disregard the law whenever it
contravened the spirit of the revolution." Id. at 19.
31 E.B. Pashukanis, The General Theory of Law and Marxism, in RUSsIAN LEGAL
THEORY 229, 314 (W.E. Butler ed., 1996) (taken originally from PASHUKANIS: SELECTED
WRITINGS ON MARXISM AND LAW 40-131 (P.B. Maggs ed., 1980)); see also TRYING TO
MAKE LAW MATTER, supra note 30, at 19-20 (describing the "exchange of commodities"
theory of law developed by Pashukanis as leading toward the dissolution of law in
general, and recognizing the great import Pashukanis' ideas had on Marxist ideology in
the 1920s).
32 See Pashukanis, General Theory, supra note 31, at 279.
33 As capitalism is dismantled during the "transitional period," the law should
eliminate the opposition of interests between the State, labor, and industry with careful
planning; the "process of creating the classless culture of the future" results in the
"gradual expulsion of the legal superstructure itself." Id. at 278-79.
34 Joseph Stalin (1879-1953) was the son of a Georgian shoemaker and was
expelled from seminary before becoming a Bolshevik revolutionary. See KERBER ET AL.,
supra note 15, at 974. At the death of Lenin in 1924, Stalin emerged victorious over
Leon Trotsky (1879-1940), the leader of the Red Army who was to succeed Lenin. See
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revolutionaries." Under Stalin, any intention to end the Party's
supremacy as a class and create a democratic, classless society,
dissipated quickly.36 The Stalin Constitution of 1936 explicitly
rejected the dissolution of the law in favor of a coercive role of
law in protection of the Soviet State." Rather than end class
distinctions, Stalinist law created new social distinctions such as
Party membership that were "relevant and often decisive in
determining the applicability of the law."3  In theory, Party
members were to be punished more harshly than citizens because
they were model citizens; but, in reality, a system of patron-client
networks emerged in which the Party instructed judges how to
decide cases involving members. 9 There were no legal procedures
holding public officials accountable for public acts.40 Trials of
"enemies of the people" and Stalin's purges in 1937-38 clearly
demonstrated that judges were instruments of the Party.4' Laws
were not published and administrative amendments made it
difficult even for specialists to accurately state the law.42 Laws
were vague, inconsistent, and often ignored in practice.43
The Marxist-Leninist rhetoric was retained to support the
totalitarian rule of the Party elite and to legitimate acts of
35 Stalin sought to focus on industrializing Russian while Trotsky hoped to end
capitalism around the world. See id. at 975-76. In the end, Stalin's nationalistic
totalitarianism won and he consolidated the power of the State as he began executing a
series of "five year plans" designed to break the power of prosperous farmers (kulaks)
and rapidly industrialize. Id. Leon Trotsky was expelled from the Communist Party
after Stalin took control of the state, and was murdered in Mexico City in 1940 by
Stalinist agents. See id. at 975.
36 "As the so-called Stalin Constitution of 1936 vividly demonstrates, Stalin had
no intention of allowing the state to wither away. Just the opposite: he wanted a strong
state .... TRYING TO MAKE LAW MATTER, supra note 30, at 20.
37 See id. at 20-21. "The Stalin Constitution is the greatest act of Soviet socialist
law which has consolidated the sum total of twenty years of triumphant development of
the Soviet state and of twenty years of struggle for socialism waged by the proletariat
and those who toil in our land." Vyshinsky, supra note 21, at 358.
38 TRYING TO MAKE LAW MATTER, supra note 30, at 21.
39 See id. at 21-22. This system became known as "telephone law." Id.
40 See id.
41 See id. at 22-23.
42 See id. at 25.
43 See id. at 26-28.
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exploitation, repression, and aggression." Stalin subordinated
everything to the "goal of rapid heavy industrialization at the
expense of the agrarian sector."4  In an effort to lay the
foundations for industrialism, Stalin developed a notion of
"revolution from above," which resulted in a policy of
"eliminating the kulaks as a class. '"
Labor law in the Soviet Union reflected the general ideological
views of the role of the Party, the law and the State. Under
Marxist-Leninist ideology, trade unions represented a "reservoir"
of State power where workers were trained in communism and
mobilized to create the "material and technical basis of
communism. ' '47 On July 15, 1970, the Supreme Soviet approved
"The Fundamentals of Labour Legislation of the USSR and the
Union Republics," a normative labor code that was "the first
national code of labour legislation in the history of the USSR.""
This act consolidated the basic provisions of socialist labor
legislation and provided a model for the republics.49  The
44 The kulaks were "liquidated, either killed or transported to distant labor camps;
the rural bourgeoisie was eliminated, to be replaced by a rural proletariat.
Collectivization was an accomplished fact by 1939." See KERBER ET AL., supra note 15,
at 976. "Twenty million people were moved off the land, which, once it had been
reorganized into larger units, and production had been mechanized, required fewer
laborers." Id.
45 MCCLELLAN, supra note 18, at 131.
I Id. at 133. "Talking of the expropriation of the kulaks, Stalin wrote that 'the
distinguishing feature of this revolution is that it is accomplished from above, on the
initiative of the state, and directly supported from below by millions of peasants."' Id.
at 135-36 (quoting J. STALIN, HISTORY OF THE CPSU: SHORT COURSE 305 (1943)). Stalin
justified the failure of the state to wither away by the "capitalist encirclement" that
presented a "danger of foreign military attack"; thus, the state should continue to exist in
Communism in one country to protect the workers. Id. at 136.
47 ROMAN LIvsHITz & VASILI NLKITINSKY, AN OUTLINE OF SOVIET LABOUR LAW
117 (1977). "Soviet power gave rise to fundamentally new relations between the state
and the trade unions that completely ruled out any possibility of antagonistic
contradictions between them. The socialist state and trade unions have a single class
basis." Id.
48 Id. at 20; see also Fundamental Labor Legislation of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics and the Union Republics, in THE SOVIET UNION THROUGH ITS LAWS
(Leo Hecht trans. & ed., 1983).
'9 The Russian Republic's Labor Code was first adopted at this time and is called
the Kodeks Zakonov o Trude RF (KZoT RF). See Labor Code of the RSFSR (1970), in
THE SOVIET CODES OF LAW 681-761 (Preston M. Torbert trans., William B. Simmons
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ideological concept of a workers' State made the freedom of labor
association irrelevant and the need for collective bargaining
absurd. In order to contrast the old law with the new, and
understand the unity between State, management, and union,
specific union rights and obligations should be analyzed under the
Soviet Labor Code.
A. State Interference in Union Activities and Union
Participation in Political Process
The State established one official union, the All-Union Central
Council of Trade Unions (AUCCTU), that unified all other
unions' 0 The labor code detailed permissible union activities,
described union obligations to the State, management, and
workers," and mandated the AUCCTU to promote worker
productivity and to help increase efficiency in the national
economy.52 On the national and republic level, the labor code
required the AUCCTU to "participate in the development and
realization of State economic development plans." 3 Further, it
ed., 1980) [hereinafter RSFSR Labor Code].
so See generally TRYING TO MAKE LAW MATTER, supra note 30, at 154 ("Both in
form and in substance, Soviet Trade unions bore only passing resemblance to their
Western counterparts. One official trade union existed in the Soviet Union: the All-
Union Central Council of Trade Unions (Vsesoiuznyi Tsentral'nyi Sovet Profsoiuzov-
Union or VtsSPS)."); Leslie Deak, Customary International Labor Laws and their
Application in Russia, 2 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 328-29 (1995) ("The State had
established the official trade union structure. Accordingly, any action taken to establish a
new union was an action against the official trade union and the State.").
51 See Fundamental Labor Legislation, supra note 48, arts. 95-99, at 125-26;
RSFSR Labor Code, supra note 49, arts. 225-35, at 748-53.
52 See LlvsHrrz & NIKITINSKY, supra note 47, at 117.
53 Fundamental Labor Legislation, supra note 48, art. 96, at 125; RSFSR Labor
Code, supra note 49, art. 226, at 749. Article 16 of the Soviet Constitution stated that
[t]he economy of the USSR is an integrated economic complex which
comprises all elements of social production, distribution and exchange on its
territory. The economy is managed on the basis of state planning for. economic
and social development.., by combining centralized direction with managerial
independence and initiative of individual and amalgamated enterprises and
other organizations.
KONST. SSSR [CONSTITUTION of the USSR], art. 16 (1977), in THE SOvIET UNION
THROUGH ITS LAWS 23, 28 (Leo Hecht trans. & ed., 1983). While the Constitution of
the USSR proclaimed fundamental principles, it was not self-executing and therefore
required implementation legislation. See Harold J. Berman, The Rule of Law and the
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allowed unions to initiate legislation in the Supreme Soviet,"' and
required them to work with enterprises, Ministries and Union
Republics in the "fixing of wages and enterprises" and the
"creation of working conditions."" In effect, unions operated as
organizational appendages of State control in partnership with
56
management.
B. Union Dependence on Management
Unions in the Soviet system performed many tasks that would
be functions of management under market economies." They
supported management decisions and were required to "help to
promote production and labor discipline."5 In addition to
management responsibilities, union leadership was co-opted by
management. 9 The State, the enterprise management, and the
Law-Based State (with special reference to developments in the Soviet Union), in
RUSSIAN LEGAL THEORY 449,452 (W.E. Butler ed., 1996).
54 See LIvSHrrz & NIKITINSKY, supra note 47, at 122-23.
55 Fundamental Labor Legislation, supra note 48, art. 96, at 125; RSFSR Labor
Code, supra note 49, art. 230, at 751.
56 See TRYiNG TO MAKE LAW MATTER, supra note 30, at 157.
57 Unions participated with management in providing job training, planning wages,
bonuses, quotas, safety measures, improving public utilities and living accommodations,
distributing social insurance, pensions, and regulating access to health resort facilities.
See LIVSHITZ & NIKITINSKY, supra note 47, at 118-19. Unions participated in national
legislation on price setting and control of consumer goods and household services. See
id. at 119.
Although workers did not have a residual claim on assets of the enterprise, they
had explicit powers within the enterprise's internal decision-making process.
These powers included the rights: 1) to independently determine how to utilize
net profit; 2) to participate in distribution of the net profit; 3) to establish policy
for compensation and define their own salary; 4) to elect the council (or board)
of the enterprise; 5) to elect the director of the enterprise and his immediate
supervisor (brigadir); and 6) other powers necessary to effectuate their self-
managing function.
Baev, supra note 28, at 253-54.
58 Fundamental Labor Legislation, supra note 48, art. 96, at 125; RSFSR Labor
Code, supra note 49, arts. 226 & 230, at 749, 750-51; Baev, supra note 28, at 253
("Indeed, trade union committees, jointly with the management, decided questions
regarding internal labor regulations, estimates for use of the enterprise's funds, payment
of bonuses, and allocation of apartments in houses owned by the enterprise.").
59 The administration of an enterprise shall grant trade unions for use free of
charge the equipped premises necessary for their activities, the conditions for
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unions planned the economy; in addition, the union primarily
distributed social goods and benefits such as housing, day care,
cars, refrigerators, televisions, food and clothing.' When workers'
interests came into conflict with State management, AUCCTU
61
supported management.
One legal duty the Union owed to workers was to ensure that
working conditions adhered to safety and "labor protection
regulations." 62 On behalf of workers, Unions administered the
State social insurance plan and ran "the sanatoria, health protection
institutions and rest homes under their management, in addition to
cultural, educational, tourist and sports facilities." 63
their grant of which shall be determined by the decision of the labor collective
with the participation of the administration and trade unions. In accordance
with the decision adopted when the collective contract is concluded, an
enterprise shall transfer for use free of charge to trade unions buildings on the
balance sheet of the enterprise or leased by it, premises, installations, and other
objects, as well as leisure base, children and youth, and other recreational
camps, needed for the organization of leisure and the concluding of cultural-
enlightenment, physical culture, and therapeutic work with working people and
their families.
On the Procedure for the Settlement of Collective Labour Disputes, Article 21, adopted
by USSR Supreme Soviet 9 Oct. 1989, in BASIC DOCUMENTS OF THE SOVIET LEGAL
SYSTEM 391-92 (W. E. Butler ed., 3d ed. 1992).
Management exercised control over union leadership in three ways: 1) while
salaries for the union leadership came from union dues, management was responsible for
bonuses to union leaders; 2) since bonuses depended on fulfillment of the plan, "union
leaders had a material stake in whether the plan was met"; and 3) although candidates
for union leadership were technically elected by workers, the list of candidates was
prepared by management together with the Party. See TRYING TO MAKE LAW MATTER,
supra note 30, at 155-56. In 1987, only four percent of union leaders were drawn from
the ranks of workers; the leadership's "lack of sympathy for workers' concerns is
therefore hardly surprising." Id. at 156. Soviet trade unionists' encouraging of
production was equal to submitting to interference because the employer ended up
directing union activities in accordance with the enterprise's production schedule. See
Deak, supra note 50, at 332.
60 See TRYING TO MAKE LAW MATTER, supra note 30, at 150-51; see also Vladmir
Ilyin, Russian Trade Unions and the Management Apparatus in the Transition Period,
in CONFLICT AND CHANGE IN THE RuSSIAN INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE 65, 67 (Simon Clarke
ed., 1996).
61 See TRYING TO MAKE LAW MATTER, supra note 30, at 154-57; Baev, supra note
28, at 253-54.
62 Fundamental Labor Legislation, supra note 48, art. 96, at 125; RSFSR Labor
Code, supra note 49, art. 230, at 751.
63 Fundamental Labor Legislation, supra note 48, art. 96, at 125; RSFSR Labor
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C. The Right to Bargain Collectively on Terms and Conditions
of Employment
While the Union was supposed to "represent the interests of
the factory and white collar workers in respect to production,
labor, well-being, and culture," collective bargaining was limited
to social benefits, because terms and conditions of employment
were established by State planning.65 Collective contracts were
permitted by the Labor Code.66 Their terms, however, were
limited by State plans and the Labor Code to general provisions,
such as "strengthening work and production discipline,"
maintaining "benefits for outstanding workers, [and] improv[ing]
housing, cultur[e] and other fringe benefits for employees.'',
D. No Right to Strike
The right to strike was notably absent from the Labor Codes.68
In a state where class conflicts were "resolved," work refusal was
a criminal act against other workers and the whole of society,
violating articles 209 or 148 of the Criminal Code.69 Therefore, in
Code, supra note 49, art. 230, at 751.
64 Fundamental Labor Legislation, supra note 48, art. 96, at 125; RSFSR Labor
Code, supra note 49, art. 226, at 749.
65 Collective bargaining agreements also existed in the Soviet Union, and their
terms were the result of negotiations between management and the proflcom,
[the ruling committee of the Union]. But these agreements were largely
meaningless. They were framed in vague and declaratory language that merely
obliged management to try to improve working conditions or accomplish other
goals. Workers had no recourse if management failed to live up to its promises.
The very fact that the profkom participated in this charade only lessened its
stature in the eyes of the workers.
TRYING TO MAKE LAW MATTER, supra note 30, at 157.
6 See Fundamental Labor Legislation, supra note 48, art. 6-9, at 100-01; RSFSR
Labor Code, supra note 49, art. 7-14, at 687-88.
67 Fundamental Labor Legislation, supra note 48, art. 7, at 100; RSFSR Labor
Code, supra note 49, art. 8, at 687.
68 See generally RSFSR Labor Code, supra note 48; MCCLELLAN, supra note 18,
at 102 ("Strikes were seen as illogical in a state 'belonging' to the workers.").
69 See Criminal Code of the RSFSR, art. 209, in THE SOvIET CODES OF LAW 133;
Criminal Code of the RSFSR, art. 148, in THE SOVIET CODES OF LAW 113. "The socialist
principle, 'he who does not work, neither shall he eat,' requires that every able bodied
citizen should work." LrvsHrrz & NIKITrNSKY, supra note 47, at 162. Thus "when a
member of socialist society shirks socially useful labour he is breaking the rules of
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the limited instances when "bargaining" was permitted, the worker
had no bargaining power with respect to management and was
consequently considered "a fungible commodity."7
E. Effective Workers'Rights
The Marxist-Leninist ideology justified this tripartite system of
administration in which the State, management and unions
planned the economy for the "benefit" of workers.7 Fundamental
worker rights to organize, bargain and strike were effectively
denied workers,72 but this does not mean workers were without
rights altogether. The Soviet Constitution guaranteed citizens the
right to work.73 State planning and labor legislation ensured full
employment.74 Job security was guaranteed by law and, practically
speaking, it was very difficult for management to discharge or
socialist life. Naturally the society struggles against violations and urges the member to
take the right path. Persuasion and education are the means used for this, and if
necessary, compulsion." Id. at 164.
70 TRYING TO MAKE LAW MATTER, supra note 30, at 147.
71 At the base of the labor relations system in the Soviet Union, as in most
countries, were the trade unions which operated as part of a tripartite system, which also
included management and the government. See Zhelenin, supra note 6. Under the
Soviet system, however, the trade unions never had a powerful role. See Deak, supra
note 50, at 331. This tripartite system under the Soviet regime has been modified since
the collapse of the Soviet Union to include the State, employers and unions; thus, when
the economy is not working, the state is still the easiest partner to blame. See Zhelenin,
supra note 6.
As is common knowledge, a tripartite agreement between employers, unions
and the Government is observed in the country, each of the sides to which has
assumed definite commitments for the period of market reforms. It can be easily
guessed that the Government is the side which flouts its commitments the most.
Id.
72 See supra Parts IIA-IID.
7 See KONsT. SSSR [CONSTITUTION OF THE USSR] art. 40 (1977), in THE SOVIET
UNION THROUGH ITS LAWS 23, 33 (Leo Hecht trans. & ed., 1983). This right included
guaranteed payment according to quality and quantity of work, right to choose trade or
profession, right to professional training and job placement. See id.
74 See LivsHrrz & NIKITINSKY, supra note 47, at 33. "The Soviet State, however,
does not simply proclaim the right to work but also ensures it by its whole system of the
economic and political organisation of society." Id.; cf. TRYING TO MAKE LAW MATTER,
supra note 30, at 150 ("[F]inding a job was typically not a problem; unemployment had
been largely eliminated thanks to the rapid industrialization drive of the 1930s.").
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transfer workers. 5 Dismissal is one area where workers could
expect courts to reverse management decisions, but workers rarely
used the courts despite rulings in their favor.76 In addition to the
right to work, citizens also had the right to health care," housing,"
social security, 9 and education." Workers were protected, in a
collective manner, by the policies of the State and management;
however, the system was not structured to protect their individual
rights as workers to choose work, choose union representation, or
81
negotiate their own employment contracts.
75 See TRYING TO MAKE LAW MATTER, supra note 30, at 52. In addition,
management had a duty to find workers a job once they were discharged. See id. at 58.
The Union also had the right to veto any dismissal or transfer made by management.
See Fundamental Labor Legislation, supra note 48, art. 18, at 104; RSFSR Labor Code,
supra note 49, art. 35, at 695. Dismissal had to be justified within the provisions of the
Labor Code detailing just causes for dismissal. See Fundamental Labor Legislation,
supra note 48, art. 17, at 103-04; RSFSR Labor Code, supra note 49, art. 33, at 693-94.
Dismissal could be justified when: 1) the enterprise closes; 2) the worker lacks skill or
capacity to execute work; 3) the worker consistently refuses to carry out his duties; 4)
there is absenteeism without excuse; 5) the worker fails to report to work for over 4
months due to disability that is not subject to exemption by law or the result of maternity
leave; or 6) reinstatement by a worker who held job previously. See id.
76 "Labor law was one of only a few areas of Soviet law in which Soviet citizens
had the right not only to question the legality of actions taken by those in positions of
authority but also to obtain ostensibly meaningful remedies." TRYING TO MAKE LAW
MATTER, supra note 30, at 50. "Empirical evidence-limited though it is---clearly
indicates that the vast majority of Soviet workers dismissed at the initiative of
management did not pursue the matter to court." Id. at 161.
77 See KoNsT. SSSR [CONsTrrUTION OF THE USSR] art. 42 (1977), in THE SOvIET
UNION THROUGH ITS LAws 23, 34 (Leo Hecht trans. & ed., 1983).
78 See id. art. 44.
79 See id. art. 43.
80 See id. art. 45.
8 1 See generally TRYING TO MAKE LAW MATTER, supra note 30, at 150-51. While
workers' individual rights were not protected, they received collective protection in the
form ofjob security and social benefits. Further, because social benefits such as housing
were distributed by the unions on the basis of seniority, there were strong incentives for
workers to find work young and stay at a job for life. See id. A worker in need of
suitable housing "might wait years, even decades" before such housing became
available. Id. at 151. As a result, workers were limited in their choice of jobs because
the union-employer structure created strong incentives to take a job for life, thereby
severely limiting an individual's choice of work.
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III. Transformation to Free Labor Market
Despite the ideology that created it, the centrally managed
economy both failed to produce goods and services efficiently and
distribute them equitably 2 and failed to contain the growth of the
"private" economy which "g[ave] rise to growing inequalities and
low morale among the population."83 These failings placed
tremendous pressure on the Soviet system. In his effort to increase
efficiency and accelerate the growth of the economy,4 Gorbachev
sought to: 1) decentralize decision making of the Ministries,
82 See, e.g., Kathryn Hendley, The Role of Law in the Russian Economic
Transition: Coping with the Unexpected in Contractual Relations, 14 Wis. INT'L L.J.
624, 629 (1996) [hereinafter Hendley, The Role ofLaw] ("Both the myth and the reality
of state control over the economy began to crack during the latter part of Gorbachev's
tenure (1987-1991)."). Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary of the Communist
Party on March 11, 1985. At that time, the Soviet economy was experiencing a certain
amount of prosperity; however, this success was short-lived, and the economy soon
began to deteriorate. See Richard C. Schneider, Jr., Privatization in One Country:
Foreign Investment and the Russian Privitization Dynamic, 17 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP.
L. REv. 697, 702-03 (1994).
83 TERRY Cox, FROM PERESTROIKA TO PRIVITISATION: THE POLITICS OF PROPERTY
CHANGE IN RUSSIAN SOcIETY 1985-1991, 42 (1996). Although a socio-economic analysis
of the pressures leading to the need for reform in the Soviet system is clearly beyond the
scope of this Comment, such an analysis would be helpful in understanding changing
worker and management perceptions of the law and economic expectations.
84 "Perestroika" was President Gorbachev's effort to streamline the Soviet
economic system, creating increased flexibility and efficiency, without destroying it.
See Hendley, The Role of Law, supra note 82.
Perestroika was aimed at scaling back the scope of the national economic plan,
and creating room for initiative from below. The purpose was to devolve
power from bureaucrats at the ministerial level to enterprise managers who were
closer to the production process. The plan was to be limited to goods of
strategic importance (as defined by the ministries). Only orders for such goods
were to be mandatory for enterprises. The use of the excess production
capacity thereby created and the allocation of profits generated were to be left
to the discretion of enterprise managers. Along similar lines, perestroika also
brought the legalization of new property forms, thereby ending the monopoly
of the state enterprise form over all productive assets. Perhaps unknowingly,
Gorbachev also laid the groundwork for economic transactions unseen in the
formal state economy since the 1920s and the days of the New Economic
Policy.
Id. at 629-30. In addition to economic reforms, President Gorbachev initiated a policy
of "openness"--or glasnost---a "willingness to discuss openly the shortcomings of the
Soviet political and social order." TRYING TO MAKE LAW MATrER, supra note 30, at 126.
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giving increased autonomy to managers;" 2) make unions more
representative of worker interest and less part of management;
8 6
3) reform the laws and court structure to facilitate the rule of law; 7
and 4) allow individuals more control over their labor activity.8
While these changes seemed to question the underlying principles
85 See Cox, supra note 83, at 51; cf TRYING TO MAKE LAW MATTER, supra note
30, at 149 (stating that while the 1988 Law on State Enterprises placed limits on the
rights of Ministries to control management and gave management more control over
resources, the law was not an effective tool for controlling the Ministries, since they
were able to circumvent the restrictions). While the 1988 Law on State Enterprises
allowed managers to challenge Ministry orders, the managers still depended on
Ministries for raw materials. See Cox, supra note 83, at 43.
86 See Cox, supra note 83, at 51. By stressing the "human factor," these reforms
created conditions for greater "creativity" and "worker innovation" while they "turned to
ways of circumventing bureaucratic opposition by empowering ordinary people in their
roles as workers and citizens." Id. Soviet scholars, freed by glasnost, began to criticize
the enterprise trade unions for bureaucratic lethargy and for "having sidestepped their
obligation to defend worker's interests." TRYING TO MAKE LAW MATTER, supra note 30,
at 157.
87 See TRYING TO MAKE LAW MATTER, supra note 30, at 34-45. Gorbachev, trained
in law himself, hoped to make the Soviet Union a "law based state." Id. at 34-35. His
approach to reform was "top-down" and suffered from bureaucratic resistance and the
"masses' disregard for these new laws." Id. at 35. Among his many legal reforms,
Gorbachev's most important innovations include: 1) the creation of government liability
for official misconduct; 2) a more impartial judiciary independent of the party; 3) the
publication of laws; 4) more freedom among lawyers to choose cases and set fees; and 5)
the repeal of presumptively unfair laws and clarification of vague and inconsistent laws.
See id. at 35-45.
Prior to the accession of Gorbachev, the concept of a law-based state, which
had been hotly debated by pre-revolutionary Russian writers... was uniformly
denounced in published Soviet political and legal literature. In theory, it
conflicted with the Marxist-Leninist doctrine that law in all societies is a
reflection of the will of the ruling class and that the state is ultimately bound by
that will and not by any laws.
Berman, supra note 53, at 449.
88 The "new law on Individual Labour Activity was adopted by the Supreme
Soviet on November 19th 1986 and scheduled for implementation on May 1st, 1987."
Cox, supra note 83, at 70. This law expanded the kinds of individual work that could
be carried out for pay and broadened the conditions under which such activity could be
carried out. See id. at 70-71. This reform was seen within the socialist framework by
Gorbachev as within "principles of socialist management, based either on cooperative
principles, or on a contractual basis with a socialist enterprise." Id. at 69 (quoting
Gorbachev). This reform underscored the "growing concern about the inability of the
state sector to provide services and consumer goods in sufficient quantity or quality to
meet demand." Id.
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of Marxist-Leninist ideology, they were administered through the
traditional mechanisms of State control and justified in Marxist-
Leninist terms." The increased openness that accompanied the
policy of glasnost lead to challenges to the Marxist-Leninist
premise itself.9°
Since the end of the Soviet era and perestroika, the Russian
State has undergone a slow, painful and uneven process of state
building.9' When Boris Yeltsin took power in 1989, he committed
to a "strategy of rapid and radical economic reform," 92 while
simultaneously adopting "the dual goal of developing a democratic
polity and creating a market economy." 93 The Russian Republic's
Constitution of 1978 was still in effect and various parties
struggled within its structure over the nature, pace, and goals of
reform.' On March 20, 1993, Yeltsin suspended parliament and
the Constitutional Court.95 During this "interregnum," Yeltsin held
new elections for parliament and a referendum on the final draft of
89 See id. at 55. "Gorbachev was happy to use the language of the revolution in
promoting [reform;] the central aims of perestroika were to maintain and strengthen the
state-owned sector of the economy as the preponderant sector." Id. "A basic
assumption behind perestroika was that the over-centralisation, corruption, and lack of
responsiveness of the Soviet system were not intrinsic to it, but products of mistaken
policies under Stalin and under Brezhnev." Id. Leonid Brezhnev (1906-1982) became
Secretary of the Communist Party in 1964, and began a policy of relaxing control on
Soviet satellite nations; "while no socialist state should permit itself to adopt policies
detrimental to the interests of international socialism, each state might proceed to
determine the most appropriate path for its own development." KERBER ET AL., supra
note 15, at 1042-43.
90 The Gorbachev years were marked by political and economic turmoil.
Although the perestroika process began as an effort to reform the existing
system, it gave rise to a reevaluation (and ultimately a rejection) of many of
Leninism's basic precepts. As private property, political pluralism, and other
concepts previously unthinkable in the Soviet Union became realities, they
required a legal foundation.
TRYING TO MAKE LAW MATTER, supra note 30, at 39.
91 See Robert Sharlet, Reinventing the Russian State: Problems of Constitutional
Implementation, 28 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 775, 775 (1995).
92 Id. at 776.
93 Id.
91 See id. Locked in a bitter struggle with rival Ruslan Khasbulatov--a new leader
of the more conservative parliament-Yeltsin supported reform at a faster pace. See id.
95 See id.
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the Constitution "revised to conform to presidential preferences.""
The new parliament was more conservative and nationalistic than
its predecessor, and the legitimacy of the Constitution was clouded
by alleged official manipulation of turnout figures.97  The
instability of the current political situation in Russia casts doubt on
the long-term commitment to economic reforms and the future of
workers in the nascent labor movement. Doubts about the
democratic process undermine the legitimacy of the State where
the Communist ideology remains a threatening alternative to
constitutional reform.
The privatization process has reflected an attempt to preserve
some of the ideological and practical aspects of a worker state.
Many workers, socialists, and unions opposed mass privatization
because it contradicted the socialist notion of the "whole people's
property."" In an effort to retain workers' controlling interest in
State owned enterprises, the Russian Federation, along with the
Czech and Slovak Republics, Romania, Kazakhstan, Ukraine,
Lithuania, and Estonia, gave vouchers to workers without
generating revenue for the State.9 Some have argued that the
voucher system and employee ownership schemes are more in line
with Marxist notions of development than the original State run
enterprises, and so the current privatization schemes could lead to
96 Id. at 777.
91 See id. at 777-78.
98 Baev, supra note 28, at 254. "Undoubtedly, the lobbying efforts of socialists
and trade unions predetermined the development of the privatization process in Russia."
Id.
99 The State Privatization Program of 1992 created three ways for a state owned
enterprise to privatize: 1) employees could receive 25% of preferred stock and 10% of
common stock free of charge while management has a call option on 5% of common
shares comprising 5% of charter capital; 2) employees could buy up to 51% of charter
capital; and 3) employees could receive a call option on common stock comprising 20%
of charter capital. See Emily Silliman & Edward Kayukov, New Company Formation in
Russia: Legal Regulation, 3 PARKER SCH. J. E. EUR. L. 175, 192 (1996). Since the end
of the voucher program on June 30, 1994, many criticisms have been levied, including:
1) failure to achieve greater efficiency; 2) failure to attract high levels of foreign
investment; and 3) failure to adequately value vouchers resulting in a huge wealth
transfer of three hundred trillion rubles in 1994 prices. See id. at 192-93; see also Baev,
supra note 28, at 254-55 ("Since the community was regarded as the owner, there were
logical arguments in favor of free distribution on an equitable basis on the ground that
the property had already been paid for by the population.").
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an even more Marxist system of employee ownership and worker
democracy.) °° The privatization program has put some fifteen
thousand mid-sized and large enterprises into private hands, and
eighty percent of Russian workers now work in privatized
enterprises, with managers and workers holding most of the
private shares.'
Despite the fact the capital and labor markets are untested,
many labor reforms have been enacted that are more suitable to a
fully developed market economy. The relevant law reforms
enacted before the new Constitution came into effect include the
1990 Labor Law Act,' the Collective Contracts and Agreements
Act of 1992,"' and the Employment Act of 1992.'0 These labor
laws amended the existing Labor Code of the Russian Federation'
and were interpreted in light of international labor standards even
before there were Constitutional and legislative grounds to use
international law.'O' This Comment focuses on the law as codified
most recently under the Labor (Trade) Union Act of 1995,"' the
Rules for the Settlement of Labor Disputes of 1995,10 and the new
100 See Baev, supra note 28, at 254.
101 See Silliman & Kayukov, supra note 99, at 193. The privatization program has
created the beginning of a capital market in Russia by "distributing some 146 million
vouchers among the Russian citizens." Id.
102 Act of the Soviet Union Socialist Republics on Trade Unions, their Rights, and
Safeguards for their Activities, IzvEsTuA (Dec. 1990) §§ 1-3, 9 [hereinafter 1990 Labor
Code]. For a discussion of the Labor Code, see Deak, supra note 50, at 334-36.
103 Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1992, No. 2490, Item 1, available in 1992 WL 472442.
104 Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1992, available in 1991 WL 496555.
105 See RSFSR Labor Code, supra note 49.
106 See Gennady M. Danilenko, The New Russian Constitution and International
Law, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 451, 462 (1994). In 1992, the Constitutional Court used
international human rights documents and International Labor Organization conventions
and recommendations to invalidate a simplified procedure under the old labor law
allowing the annulment of labor contracts when workers reached pension age. See id.
(citing Vedomosti Fed. Sobr. RF, 1992, No. 13, Item 669).
107 Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1995, No. 10, Item FZ, available in 1996 WL 128400
[hereinafter RF Trade Union Act]. There is no detailed analysis of the recent labor laws
in Russia. Most analysts of privatization focus on the development of capital and
management in enterprise organization and ignore the importance of labor relations,
despite the singular importance of labor in the transformation of a workers state into a
democratic market economy.
108 Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1995, No. 175, Item FZ, available in 1995 WL 798964
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amendments to the Law on Employment. °9  With very few
exceptions, these acts replace the old Soviet system with worker
rights conforming to international labor standards"' that are more
progressive than United States labor law."' The radical departure
from Marxist-Leninist ideology underlying the labor law of the
Soviet system can be seen in the comparison of the new Russian
Federation labor reforms with labor standards internationally"' and
in the United States."'
[hereinafter RF Collective Labour Disputes Act].
10 Amendments and Addenda to Law of the Russian Federation "On Employment
of Population in the Russian Federation," Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1996, No. 36, Item FZ,
available in 1996 WL 560841 [hereinafter RF Employment Amendments].
110 See KONST. RF [CONSTITUTION OF THE RUSSIAN SOvIET FEDERATED SOCIALIST
REPUBLIC] art. 15, cl. 4, translated in THE CONSTITUTION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
(Finnish Lawyers' Publ. 1994) "Universally-recognized norms of international law and
international agreements of the Russian Federation are a component of its legal system.
If an international agreement of the Russian Federation fixes other rules than those
envisaged by law, the rules of the international agreement are used." Id.; see also
Danilenko, supra note 106, at 464-67 (describing the relation between the Russian
Constitution and International treaties, norms and principles); Deak, supra note 50, at
334. The drafts of the earlier reforms nearly conform to international standards. See id.
at 334-35. This analysis will show that the latest reforms more fully comply than the
initial reforms. The rapid succession of amendments has created multiple layers of
provisions building on the Basic Labor Code of the Russian Federation. This makes it
difficult to determine how much the new provisions have modified older code. To avoid
the risk of misinterpreting the new meaning of the old code in light of the amendments,
this discussion will primarily focus on the most recent amendments themselves in so far
as they stand alone.
"I See infra notes 115-88 and accompanying text.
112 The freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining have been
defined through the International Labour Organisation (ILO) multilateral conventions.
There are two relevant conventions: the Convention Concerning Freedom of Association
and Protection of the Right to Organise, No. 87, opened for signature July 9, 1948 31
ILO Official Bull., Ser. B, No. 1 [hereinafter ILO Convention No. 87], and the
Convention Concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right to Organise and
Bargain Collectively, No. 98, opened for signature July 1, 1949, 32 ILO Official Bull.,
Ser. B., No. 3 [hereinafter ILO Convention No. 98]. See also EDWARD E. POTTER,
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION, THE RIGHT TO ORGANIZE AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: THE
IMPACT ON U.S. LAW AND PRACTICE OF RATIFICATION OF ILO CONVENTIONS No. 87 &
No. 98 (1984); Deak, supra note 50, at 322-23.
113 Labor relations in the United States are regulated by the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA). National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49
Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-87 (1988)). Subsequent
amendments such as the Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No.
80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-97 (1988)), and
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A. Coverage of Labor Law Protection
The Russian Federation has adopted legislation giving the right
to organize and bargain to all employees, and broadly defining an
employee as "a natural person working in an organization under a
labour agreement (contract), a person engaged in individual
entrepreneurial activity, a person studying at an educational
institution of primary, secondary, or higher professional
education.""' 4 This broad coverage comports with international
standards that guarantee the right of workers and employers to join
organizations of their choosing "without distinction
whatsoever.""' 5 The Russian Federation has provided special rules
for organizing the military, employees of internal affairs agencies,
the security service, customs, police, judges, and prosecutors." 6
International standards would allow states to exclude the armed
forces and the police from the right to join labor organizations, but
all other public employees should have the right to organize."7
In the United States, the right to organize and bargain
collectively is more circumscribed. Under the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA), supervisors,"8 agricultural workers,
the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrun-Griffin) Act of 1959, Pub.
L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (1959) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 153-87
(1988)), are collectively referred to as the National Labor Relations Act.
"4 RF Trade Union Act, supra note 107, ch. I, art. 3. In addition to employees,
those who are "temporarily not working, or who are pensioners" are allowed to join
labor unions. Id. Chapter I, Article 1(2) provides that
every person attaining the age of 14 years and engaged in labour (professional)
activity shall have the right to set up, at his discretion, labor unions for the
protection of his interests, to join these, and to engage in labor union activity
and to withdraw from labor unions.
Id. ch. I, art. 1(2).
115 ILO Convention No. 87, supra note 112, art. 2.
116 See RF Trade Union Act, supra note 107, ch. I, art. 4, § 2. See, e.g., Customs
Code of the Russian Federation, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, No. 5221, Item 1, art. 421,
available in 1993 WL 831295 ("The customs officials shall not have the right.., to
organize strikes and to participate in them.").
117 See ILO Convention No. 87, supra note 112, art. 9.
118 The definition of "supervisors" is interpreted broadly and so many employees
with very little supervisory responsibility are exempted from collective bargaining.
NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of Am., 511 U.S. 571, 576-80 (1994)
(licensed-practical nurses classifying as supervisory because of their role in directing,
evaluating, and disciplining nurses' aides).
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domestic servants, independent contractors, and many public
employees are given the right to organize without the
corresponding right to protected bargaining."9 In addition, the
United States Supreme Court has withdrawn coverage for
managers ° as well as "confidential employees who assist and act
in a confidential capacity to persons who formulate, determine,
and effectuate management policies in the field of labor
relations."'' The armed forces have no collective bargaining
rights in the United States, 2 and the ability of police officers to
collective bargaining is usually limited by state law. 3 Unlike the
Russian Federation, students in the United States are not
considered employees and have no right to organize and bargain
collectively.2 4 Thus, the Russian Federation is more in compliance
with international labor standards than the United States with
respect to those given the right to organize and bargain
collectively.
As we have seen, providing the right to join a union to a broad
range of individuals is not technically a recent innovation to
Russian law.2 5 Under the Soviet regime, everyone belonged to the
official trade union, AUCCTU (VTsSPS), and few employees
opted out of the union, fearing the loss of benefits associated with
work such as housing, kindergartens, youth camps, and other
services.26 If employees continue to belong to official unions
without demanding the enforcement of their legal rights, broad
legal protections are meaningless.
119 See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1988).
120 See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
121 NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 454 U.S. 170, 172
(1981).
122 See POTTER, supra note 112, at 41. Potter notes that the Civil Service Reform
Act allows National Guard technicians limited collective bargaining rights as federal
employees. See id. at41 n.144.
123 Seeid. at41.
124 See Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 223 N.L.R.B. 251 (1976) (holding that medical
interns and residents are primarily students and not employees under the act, and,
therefore, cannot bargain collectively).
125 See supra notes 114-18 and accompanying text.
126 See TRYING TO MAKE LAW MATTER, supra note 30, at 154.
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B. Worker Right to Join and Participate in Union of Choice
Without Discrimination
To make the right to union participation meaningful, workers
must have a choice between union representatives and protection
from discrimination on the basis of union activity. In the United
States, a union enjoying the majority vote of a bargaining unit
becomes the exclusive representative of all the employees in that
unit.2  Thus, an employee in the minority who is unhappy with
union representation will be denied the ability to bargain
individually with the employer. 2 '
Given the unitary union structure of Russia's history, the
majority-rule doctrine would not facilitate the transition to
meaningful labor relations. Most employees are default members
of the ex-official unions, and so the majority-rule would restrict
the development of smaller, truly independent unions.'29 The
Russian Federation has not adopted exclusivity and multiple
primary labor organizations, as are contemplated by the act.3
While rejection of the majority-rule doctrine may increase union
rivalry and weaken overall union bargaining power, worker choice
will ultimately be facilitated. The rejection of exclusivity
127 "Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining
by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the
exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective
bargaining .... NLRA § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. §§ 152-68 (1988).
128 See Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50
(1975) (holding that when an employee objects to the handling of a racial discrimination
grievance by the union, direct protests and opposition by the complaining employee
against the employer is prohibited by the majority/exclusivity rule that establishes the
union as the exclusive representative of employees). Critics of the exclusivity rule show
how it undermines union ability to represent conflicting interests of employees when the
workforce is divided in racial and gendered terms. See Marion Crain & Ken Matheny,
Labor's Divided Ranks: Privilege and United Front Ideology 31 (1996) (unpublished
manuscript on file with authors).
129 "Non-exclusivity is imperative in Russia because the former official trade unions
still exist in all enterprises, and non-exclusivity was the only way to allow new unions to
develop." Deak, supra note 50, at 336.
130 See RF Trade Union Act, supra note 107, ch. II, art. 13(1). "Where several
primary labour-union organizations of different labour unions operate in an
organization, their representation in collective bargaining and conclusion of collective
contracts shall be determined with due account of the number of represented labour-
union members." Id.
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complies with ILO Convention No. 87, Article 2, which promotes
workers' "right . . . to join the organisations of their own
choosing."''
Provisions prohibiting management discrimination against
employees who participate in union activities support a worker's
right to join union organizations. Recent reforms prohibit
discrimination in the Russian Federation.'32 Article 9 fulfills the
international labor standards requirement that "[w]orkers shall
enjoy adequate protection against acts of anti-union discrimination
in respect of their employment."'3 Because many claims turn on
who carries the burden of proof, the burden of proving anti-union
animus is one important question left open by the Russian labor
act. In practice, the 1LO requires the employer to show no anti-
union animus once a discrimination claim is brought.' Since this
question is left open by -the Labor Trade Union Act, one may
conclude that the Russian Federation follows ILO practice because
the act states: "Where international treaties of the RF and
conventions of the International Labour Organization ratified by
the RF lay down rules other than those provided for by the present
Federal Act, the rules of the treaties and conventions shall
apply.'
' 35
In the United States, anti-union discrimination is also
prohibited. Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA makes it unlawful for an
employer "by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of
employment ... to encourage or discourage membership in any
131 ILO Convention No. 87, supra note 112, art. 2. The committee of experts that
develop commentary on the ILO has stated that the "right to join" should be interpreted
to mean that "minority organisations should be allowed to function and at least have the
right to make representations on behalf of their members and to represent them in the
case of individual gievances." POTTER, supra note 112, at 15 (quoting 1983 Report of
the Committee of the Experts, para. 141). This is clearly contrary to U.S. application of
the exclusivity rule, which would prohibit minority union representation of individual
grievances. See id.
132 See RF Trade Union Act, supra note 107, ch. 1, art. 9. "Making a person's
admittance to employment, promotion at work, and also dismissal from work
conditional on his labour-union affiliation or non-affiliation shall be prohibited." Id.
133 ILO Convention No. 98, supra note 112, art. 1(1).
134 See POTrER, supra note 112, at 52 (citing 1983 Report of the Committee of
Experts, paras. 271, 280).
135 RF Trade Union Act, supra note 107, ch. 1, art. 6(3).
[Vol. 23
LABOR LAW REFORM IN THE RF
labor organization."'36 However, the General Counsel of the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) bears the burden of
persuading the Board that the employer acted on anti-union
animus.' Thus, while the Russian Federation complies with
international labor standards, the United States is in violation of
ILO Convention No. 98 with respect to the allocation of proof in
discrimination cases."i
Where communist leadership is still inseparable from union
leadership, anti-union discrimination may be a difficult issue for
the Russian Federation. Communists view trade unions as a
training ground for communist action,139 and thus management
may have legitimate business interests in discriminating against
communists without necessarily maintaining any anti-union bias.
Nonetheless, the Russian Federation cannot legislate a remedy
without violating ILO Convention No. 87 Article 2; which protects
the unfettered right to join and participate in union activities. '40
Such attempts to restrict communist membership in unions in the
United States have been held unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court,' 4' and no successful challenge has been made that
challenges the practice of requiring union officials to sign non-
communist affidavits.
42
C. Union Independence from State Interference
Freedom from State and management interference in union
136 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1988). Section 158(a)(4) also makes it unlawful for an
employer "to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because he has
filed charges or given testimony under this Act." Id. § 158(a)(4) (1988).
137 See NLRB v. Transp. Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 395 (1983); see also
POTTER, supra note 112, at 52.
138 See POTTER, supra note 112, at 52.
139 See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
140 See ILO Convention No. 87, supra note 112, art. 2. Such state interference with
internal union membership would also constitute a violation of ILO Convention No. 87
art. 3(2). See POTTER, supra note 112, art. 3(2), at 10-12, 25.
141 See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 461 (1965).
142 Such a challenge was raised in Driscoll v. International Union of Operating
Engineers, Local 139, but the case was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds. See Driscoll
v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 139, 484 F.2d 682 (7th Cir. 1973); see
also POTTER, supra note 112, at 11.
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affairs is a necessary pre-requisite to the rights to organize and
bargain collectively. If unions cannot operate democratically and
develop their own rules, then they cannot act as independent
representatives of worker interests. Recognizing the importance of
union autonomy, the 1LO has established that 1) "[w]orkers' and
employers' organisations shall have the right to draw up their
constitutions and rules, and to elect their representatives in full
freedom, to organise their administration and activities and to
formulate their programmes," and 2) "[t]he public authorities shall
refrain from any interference which would restrict this right or
impede the lawful exercise thereof."' 43 The Russian Federation has
adopted this principle as well,'" but some analysts have pointed
out that the broad powers given the President under the
Constitution 145 would allow executive decrees aimed at particular
union practices in specified enterprises.'" If this Presidential
power were exercised to set limits on union organization and
activity, effectively amending the legislation by executive decree,
the statutes would violate international standards of union
autonomy. Economic conditions have not yet developed to the
point for a meaningful test of executive resolve.
Union autonomy is not an explicit goal of labor law in the
United States. Rather, the NLRA protects individual rights as
workers act collectively. 47 Under the LO and the RF Trade Union
Act, workers' rights are derivative of the union's right to organize
and bargain. 148 Presumably this policy applies to the RF Trade
Union Act by incorporation. "" On the other hand, under the
NLRA, union rights are derivative of employees' "full freedom of
143 ILO Convention No. 87, supra note 112, art. 3(2).
144 See RF Trade Union Act, supra note 107, ch. I, art. 5.
145 See KONST. RF [CONSTITUTION OF THE RussIAN SOVIET FEDERATED SOCIALIST
REPUBLIC] arts. 95, 115, translated in THE CONSTITUTION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
(Finnish Lawyers' Publ. 1994).
1 See Baev, supra note 28, at 288. "In other words, the Russian government and
President possess an enormous capacity to influence the board of directors of almost any
national corporation by issuing an individual decree pertaining to the specific business
matters of the particular company." Id.
147 See POTrER, supra note 112, at 18.
148 See id.
149 See supra note 130.
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association, self organization, and designation of representatives of
their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and
conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or
protection." 5 ° State interference in union organization may be
justified in the United States to protect against union coercion,
undermining workers' freedom of choice.51 Sometimes the
workers' right to refrain from joining a labor organization conflicts
with the union's right to make its own rules. In Pattern Makers'
League of North America v. NLRB,'52 the United States Supreme
Court held that a union's rule prohibiting members from resigning
in anticipation of or during a strike violated the workers' "right to
'refrain from any or all [concerted] . . . activities.""" Under the
ILO and Russian Federation approaches, this ruling would violate
the union's right to create its own rules.
While the State cannot interfere in internal union affairs in
Russia, trade unions can take an active role in political activity
relating to the "protection of social and labour rights and interests
of employees.', 5 4 The government is required to consider "with
due account" proposals made by all-Russia labor unions. 5 ' In
addition, labor unions have the right to make legislative
proposals.'56 There are no restrictions on the political actions of
150 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988).
151 Title IV of the Landrum-Griffin Act, which establishes comprehensive election
procedures and requires certain union financial disclosures, violates ILO standards. See
POTTER, supra note 112, at 22-23.
152 473 U.S. 95 (1985).
153 Id. at 100 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 157). The tension between individual and group
rights is manifest when comparing the majority's individualist approach with the
dissent's collective perspective. The dissent argued that this holding violated the
employee's right to act collectively and to promulgate rules binding on that collective.
See id. at 118 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
154 RF Trade Union Act, supra note 107, ch. II, art. 11(1).
155 Id. All-Russia labor unions are
voluntary amalgamation[s] of labour-union members working in one or more
branches of activity linked by common social and labor and professional
interests, operating throughout RF territory or in the territories of over one-half
of RF subjects or uniting at least one-half of the total number of workers of one
or more branches of activity.
Id. ch. I, art. 3.
156 See id. ch. II, art.l 1(1).
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unions that would violate international standards.' In the United
States, however, there are clear lines between union political and
economic activity. Section 304 of the Labor Management
Relations Act (LMRA) restricts both union and employer political
contributions to federal elections. 5 The Supreme Court has also
held that unions cannot use dues collected under an agency shop
arrangement for political purposes unrelated to collective
bargaining.'59 Critics in the United States argue for union freedom
to participate in political action and note that labor's role in
politics has been historically significant.' 6° In the case of the
Russian Federation, a distinction between political and economic
roles of the union might facilitate union organizing and collective
bargaining by disassociating unions from the Communist Party
and severing the connection between the ex-official unions and the
State. Separating economic and political roles of the union, as the
United States has done, might be a practical step toward
legitimizing unions in the eyes of workers.
D. Separation of Union Organization from Management
Control
Unions in the Russian Federation need autonomy not only
from the State, but from management as well. The new labor law
calls for such union autonomy: "Labor unions shall be independent
in their activity from the organs of executive power, the organs of
local self-government, employers and their amalgamations ...
political parties and other public entities, and shall not be
accountable to them or subject to their control.' 6
This legal declaration of independence for unions is an
incredible departure from the former Soviet system in which
management exercised direct financial control over the chairman
of the union projkom (executive committee) and provided bonuses
1" See ILO Convention No. 87, supra note 112, art. 3.
158 See LMRA § 304, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-67, 171-97 (1988).
l See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
160 See C. REHMUS & D. MCLAUGHLIN, LABOR AND AMERICAN POLITICS: A BOOK
OF READINGS (1967).
161 RF Trade Union Act, supra note 107, ch. I, art. 5(1) (emphasis added).
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to union officers.62 This radical shift in union structure also
comports with international standards, prohibiting employer acts
which tend to control unions.'63 In the United States, § 8(a)(2) of
the NLRA makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to
dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any
labor organization or to contribute financial or other support to
it." The ex-official union refusal to break ties with management is
one of the main impediments to worker negotiation of the terms of
their employment. 65 Currently, the unions believe they can best
represent workers by colluding with management and striking
against the State for larger enterprise subsidies.1 "
E. Worker Right to Bargain Collectively on All Terms and
Conditions of Employment
ILO Convention No. 98 requires nations to create the
conditions necessary to encourage and promote voluntary
collective bargaining. 167 As interpreted by the ILO Committee on
Freedom of Association, ILO Convention No. 98 requires that
1) the terms and conditions of employment be regulated by
collective bargaining agreements voluntarily negotiated by
autonomous parties,66 and 2) the government promote collective
162 See TRYING TO MAKE LAW MATTER, supra note 30, at 155.
163 See ILO Convention No. 98, supra note 112, art.2.
'6 See 29 U.S.C. § 152(a) (1988); see also NLRB v. Pa. Greyhound Lines, 303
U.S. 261 (1938) (finding an unfair labor practice based on evidence that company
representatives were active in promoting.the plan, and urging employees to join in the
preparation of the details of organization, including the bylaws).
165 See Deak, supra note 50, at 340.
16 "Some of the ex-official unions, perhaps the majority, have not moved at all
from their position of colluding with management and distributing benefits. They do
not fight for the workers directly. Instead of striking for wage increases, they strike for
increased subsidies for the enterprise." Id.
167 See LAMMY BETrTEN, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR LAW 69 (1993); INTERNATIONAL
LABOUR OFFICE, SUMMARIES OF INTERNATIONAL LABOUR STANDARDS 6 (2d ed., 1990)
[hereinafter INTERNATIONAL LABOUR STANDARDS].
168 Article 2 seeks to protect workers organizations and employers from interference
in defining and pursuing their interests, and views collective bargaining as the preferred
method of resolving disputes between employers and employees. See INTERNATIONAL
LABOUR STANDARDS, supra note 167, at 6; see also N. VALTICOS, INTERNATIONAL
LABOUR LAW 87 ("Another aim of the convention is protection, primarily of trade
19981
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bargaining by legislation and enforcement mechanisms that
facilitate bargaining and adequate dispute resolution.'69 This
requirement has been interpreted to mean that the government
should not establish mandatory and discretionary items of
bargaining or legislate terms of employment.' 7' The United States
clearly violates this requirement in that sections 8(d) & 8(a)(5)
require bargaining on wages, hours and other terms and conditions
unions, against acts of interference, although the matter is mentioned in respect to both
workers' and employers' organizations."). For a discussion of the implied right of free
collective bargaining, see BETTEN, supra note 167, at 95-105.
169 See ILO Convention No. 98, supra note 112, art. 4; see also POTTER, supra note
112, at 56-57; INTERNATIONAL LABOUR STANDARDS, supra note 167, at 6 ("Measures
appropriate to national conditions shall be taken, where necessary, to encourage and
promote the development and utilisation of voluntary collective bargaining to regulate
terms and conditions of employement."); VELTICOS, supra note 168, at 87 (stating that
"Art. 4 requires the government to encourage and promote conditions for successful
voluntary negotiation between employers and workers").
70 See POTTER, supra note 112, at 58-59. When interpreting ILO Convention No.
98, the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association case law has established principles
that preclude governmental ratification of collective bargaining agreements based on
certain terms and conditions approved by the government. See A. Pankert, Freedom of
Association, in COMPARATvE LABOR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 146, 158 (R.
Blanpain ed., 1982).
The most important principle adopted in this respect by the Committee of
Freedom of Association can be summarised as follows: right to bargain
collectively is a fundamental trade union rights;--legislation excluding certain
matters from the field of collective bargaining or providing that collective
agreements may not grant more favourable terms and conditions than those set
out in the law are contrary to Convention No. 98;--legislation according to
which collective agreements must be approved by the public authorities before
becoming effective are contrary to Convention No. 98; governments may feel in
certain cases that the economic situation of the country calls for stabilisation
measures during the application of which it would not be possible for wage
rates to be fixed freely by means of collective bargaining. Such a restriction,
however, should be imposed as an exceptional measure and to the extent
necessary, without exceeding a reasonable period, and it should be
accompanied by adequate safeguards to protect workers' living standards.
Id. at 158. When interpreting ALO Convention No. 98, the ILO Committee on Freedom
of Association case law consistently prohibits governmental interference in trade union
organization activities such as: "inspection of trade union books and records,
cancellation of legal personality by administrative means, monitoring union meetings,
obliging unions to apply political and economic directives, and intervening in collective
bargaining and industrial action." BETTEN, supra note 167, at 94 (emphasis added).
The Committee of experts has declared that freedom in negotiating wages and working
conditions is a fundamental part of free association. Id. at 97.
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of employment.7 '
Russia may also violate this standard because the content of
the collective contract is defined by statute.' The statute prohibits
negotiation of benefits lower than those mandated by law,' and
may also limit the subjects of bargaining.74 Thus, even though
many collective bargaining issues are still determined by
administrative ministries, they establish a floor and may not
interfere with bargaining in practice.'75 Some familiar statutory
'7' See 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1988); see also Fiberboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. NLRB,
379 U.S. 203 (1964) (setting out considerations for determining whether certain items
were mandatory bargaining items under the act).
172 See RF Collective Contracts and Agreements Act, RF Act No. 2490, Item 1, ch.
III, art. 13, available in 1992 WL 472442 [hereinafter RF CBA Act].
173 Chapter.I, Article 2 of the RF CBA Act states that "[t]he terms of collective
contracts or agreements worsening employees' conditions, as compared with legislation,
shall be invalid. Labour contracts may not include provisions worsening employees'
condition, as compared with legislation, collective contracts and agreements." RF CBA
Act, supra note 172, ch. I, art. 2.
174 Chapter III, Article 13 states that a "[c]ollective contract may include mutual
obligations by employer and employees on the following matters: form, system and
amount of pay, money rewards, grants, compensations, additional payments, mechanism
for regulating remuneration depending on price rises, inflation, and attainment of targets
written into collective contract. . ." Id. This may violate the ILO. If this list is read as
an exclusive exposition of the areas of bargaining, then the Act-may violate the ILO
because the government is prescribing the acceptable limits of bargaining in advance
and conditioning the conclusiveness of the agreement on these conditions-no matter
how broad ranging. Cf Pankert, supra note 170, at 158 ("legislation excluding certain
matters from the field of collective bargaining.., are contrary to Convention No. 98").
While Article 13 provides that "[t]he content and structure of the collective contract
shall be determined by the parties," the RF CBA Act also requires that contracts comply
with all legislation, including the list of terms and conditions parties may bargain over.
Id. Article 4 under Chapter I sets out factors to determine the conclusiveness of
collective bargaining agreements, including: "compliance with legislative norms;
empowerment of the parties' representatives; equality of the parties; free choice and
discussion of issues constituting the subject-matter of collective contracts and
agreements; voluntary assumption of obligations; guarantees of assumed obligations;
systematic control and unavoidable liability ... ." Id. Thus, it seems that parties are
free to determine the subject-matter of their agreements within the parameters set out in
the Act, including the list of subjects they may consider.
175 Deak states that the possible subjects of bargaining are within the ILO
Convention's requirements. "The scope of bargaining is well within the internationally
designated area. The collective bargaining agreements should cover wages and the
general compensation package, work-time and leave-time, health and safety protection,
and a variety of other work condition issues." Deak, supra note 50, at 337-38. Yet, she
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items permitted in a collective bargaining agreement include:
wages, hours, vacation, medical and social insurance, workplace
health and safety, and no-strike provisions. 76 Other statutory
bargaining items reveal the changing nature of the Russian
economy: 1) "employment, retraining, and terms of redundancy,"
and 2) "measures to safeguard both the interests of employees in
the event of privatization, and the interests of employees with
regard to departmental housing.'7, 7 Other provisions regulate the
validity of the collective bargaining agreement during
reorganization and changes in ownership. " ' Thus, to a certain
also recognizes that
[m]any of the collective bargaining issues remain in the hands of the
administrative ministries. Significantly, the law, by implication, allows the
negotiation of benefits greater than those allowed by law. The statute prohibits
the negotiation of benefits below those mandated by law, implying that
collective bargaining contracts can only cover benefits greater than those the
law provides.
Id. She concludes that "the ministry regulation might not substantially interfere with
collective bargaining negotiations." Id.
Deak's interpretation may be contrary to the ILO. However, under interpretations
of the ILO Convention No. 98, such governmental interference with the subjects of
bargaining is contrary to its purposes. The case law developed by the ILO Committee
on Freedom of Association clearly indicates that the government may not interfere in
collective bargaining by "intervening in collective bargaining and industrial action."
BETrEN, supra note 167, at 94-95. When provisions of collective bargaining agreements
are contrary to government policies, governments should "try to persuade the parties to
collective bargaining to have regard voluntarily in their negotiations to major economic
and social policy considerations." Id. at 97. Any control retained by the ministries over
issues considered in collective bargaining would thus violate ILO interpretations of the
freedom of association.
176 See RF CBA Act, supra note 172, art. 13.
177 Id.
178 See id. art. 14.
Collective contract, shall remain valid in the event of changes in the
composition, structure, or name of the managerial organ of the enterprise, or
recision of labour contract with the head of the enterprise. At reorganization of
enterprise, collective contract shall remain valid throughout the reorganization
period, and may then be reviewed on the initiative of either party. At change of
owner of enterprise assets, collective contract shall remain valid for three
months. In that period, the parties shall be entitled to start negotiations with a
view to concluding a new collective contract or retaining, amending, or
expanding the existing contract.
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extent, workers should be able to bargain with enterprise managers
over how privatization proceeds.
F. Worker Right to Strike
The final and most fundamental right workers possess is the
right to strike. Refusing to work, an illegal act under the Soviet
regime, 9 forms the basis of the workers' collective bargaining
power. The ILO recognizes the right to strike as the fundamental
essence of labor organizational autonomy and freedom of
association.'"0 The right to strike is guaranteed by the new Russian
Constitution.' The Collective Labour Disputes Act sets out
procedures for resolving labor disputes and for the declaration and
execution of peaceful strikes when conciliation procedures fail. 2
One of the most notable sections of this Act is article 17 which
defines illegal strikes.'83 A strike is declared illegal in four
instances: 1) when unions fail to follow conciliation and notice
179 See Criminal Code of the RSFSR, art. 209, in THE SOVIET CODES OF LAW 133;
Criminal Code of the RSFSR, art. 148, in THE SOVIET CODES OF LAW 113; see also
supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text (discussing the Soviet prohibition against
organized strikes).
180 See generally ILO Convention No. 98, supra note 112, art 4; ILO Convention
No: 87, supra note 112, ait. 3. While Conventions No. 87 and No. 98 do not explicitly
recognize the right to strike or collectively bargain, these rights have been found implicit
in these conventions. See Deak, supra note 50, at 329 n.54; see also VALTICOS, supra
note 168, at 85-86; Pankert, supra note 170, at 159 (noting that while the conventions
do not explicitly state a right to strike, "[t]he Committee on Freedom of Association has
recognised this right with certain restrictions"). The basic rules governing strikes are that
1) a general prohibition on strikes is contrary to Convention No. 87; 2) prohibitions on
strikes because they are "prejudicial to public order, nation interest or economic
development are not admissible, because they are drafted in too general a way"; 3)
"prohibition on purely political strikes is admissible"; 4) restrictions requiring
conciliation procedures, safety measures and on public employees in essential services
also are tolerated. Id. at 159. But see BETTEN, supra note 167, at 105-23 (noting that the
right to strike implicit in the ILO Conventions has recently been challenged by employer
groups).
181 See KONST. RF [CONSTITUTION OF THE RUSSIAN SOVIET FEDERATED SOCIALIST
REPUBLIC] art. 37, translated in THE CONSTITUTION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
(Finnish Lawyers' Publ. 1994). This right is developed further in the recent act on
resolution of collective labor disputes. See RF Collective Labour Disputes Act, supra
note 108.
182 See RF Collective Labour Dispute Act, supra note 108.
183 See id. art. 17.
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procedures; 2) when strikes pose "a real threat to the fundamentals
of the constitutional system;" 3) when strikes of armed forces,
law-enforcement, or security service "pose a threat" to State
security; and 4) when required by "state-of-emergency laws."'"
When workers strike illegally, they may be "subjected to
disciplinary penalty for violation of labour discipline," and the
unions must pay damages to the employer "caused by the illegal
strike."'85 Otherwise, legal strikers are protected from being fired,
and are protected from State and management coercion. 6
As defined in the statute, the right to strike in Russia is broader
than in the United States where workers may be temporarily or
permanently replaced while on strike, and the purposes and means
of striking are heavily regulated. 8 '
IV. Conclusion
Given the Russians' very liberal and open labor law and
Constitution, the question arises whether this law will have any
meaningful effect in the Russian context of economic uncertainty
and political turmoil. In this regard, the final part of the Comment
will touch on some of the major obstacles facing the new labor
law. Two general areas of concern immediately present
themselves: 1) the schism between the chaos of the Russian
economy and idealized labor legislation, and 2) the inadequacy of
19 Id. art. 17(1)-(4).
185 Id. arts. 22(1), 22(2).
186 See id. art 18. It is also interesting to note that employers may not lock out
employees in anticipation of a strike and hire temporary replacement workers as they
can in the United States. Compare id. art. 19 (prohibiting lockouts in Russia) with
NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278 (1965) (allowing lockouts in the United States).
187 See Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 295 (1956) (stating, in
dictum, that it has never been successfully challenged that workers striking to protest an
unfair labor practice may sue to get reinstated while workers striking for economic
benefits may be permanently replaced by substitute workers). "Thus, if an employer
discharges workers because they engage in a sit-down strike for higher wages, the Board
cannot order him to reinstate the strikers." Id. The legality of a strike, boycott, or picket
depends on such factors as the location, objectives, and means of the strike, as well as
who is being boycotted (employers or third parties). See Allan E. Korpela, Annotation,
Validity and Construction of§ 303 of Labor Management Relations Act (29 U.S.C.A. §
187) Giving Right ofAction Against Union for Inducing Strikes and Secondary Boycotts,
7 A.L.R. FED. 767 (1971).
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the legal infrastructure relating to the judiciary's lack of
independence, effective remedies, and experience in balancing
constitutional rights of property, free speech, and labor organizing.
The Russian economy is in a deep depression and is further
destabilized by the prevalence of organized crime. 8 As production
and investment drop, debt between enterprises increases; thus,
trading occurs mainly on the basis of advance payments. 9 Cuts in
production have led to mass discharges as "redundancies" are
being removed from enterprise organization and management."
As economic conditions worsen, "the divergent interests of
different groups of employees," such as service employees,
industrial workers, managers, and laborers, become more
apparent.'9' Meanwhile, trade unions operate more like "consumer
cooperatives," colluding with management in a way that ignores
the differentiation occurring in the labor market.92 Just as the
conditions for workers get increasingly difficult, just as the need
for trade union protection is the greatest, and just as the labor law
is transformed to facilitate worker collective action, it is highly
unlikely that trade unions will represent the interests of workers. 93
188 See Gilder D. Jackson, Doing Business in Russia: A Practical Guide for
American Investors, 3 J. INT'L L. & PRAc. 111, 151 (1994) ("In the case of doing
business in Russia, the risks appear formidable, especially in light of the ever changing
business and legal environments, coupled with corruption and growing criminal
enterprises.").
189 See Gerchikov, supra note 8, at 142-43.
190 See id. at 149; see also Irina Kozina & Vadim Borisov, The Changing Status of
Workers in the Enterprise, in CONFLICT AND CHANGE IN THE RUSSIAN INDUSTRIAL
ENTERPRISE 136, 168 (1996) (stating that the most important factor in changing the
status of workers is "a sharp decrease in volumes of production as a result of reduced
state orders, confusion in the supply system, price increases and the non-payment
crisis").
191 Gerchikov, supra note 8, at 164.
192 See id. "We think it is important to stress that the trade unions do not recognize
this differentiation and consider all employees to be a unified community without
contradictions." Id. The old Soviet trade unions have survived and "retain their main
feature: they are still effectively departments of the administration for social issues."
Ilyin, supra note 60, at 65, 105.
193 See Gerchikov, supra note 8, at 168. "There is little evidence to suggest that in
the near future the trade unions will transform their role and become a main force in
initiating . . . bargaining relations." Id. It is more likely that they will "support
management as a strategy for survival." Id. at 167.
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By stressing employee and management ownership of State
enterprises, the method of privatization has probably contributed
to the difficulty in establishing Western styled labor relations.'
94
The labor relations legislation in the United States and under ILO
Conventions is premised on the inherent conflict between workers
and capital. In the United States, for example, when employees
gain a controlling interest in a company through an employee
stock ownership plan (ESOP), they lose their protection under the
NLRA.195 The Russia Federation's voucher system, which gives
ownership interests to workers, may have therefore undermined
the ability of workers and the trade unions to see the value of
collective organization and bargaining.'" This means that the
labor legislation modeled on international standards does not fit
the emerging economic relationship between labor and
management in Russia.
The incongruence between Western labor legislation and the
Russian privatization can be explained historically. In the West,
trade unions arose in response to the development of the economy
that pitted labor against capital.'97 The principal function of trade
unions was to protect workers from market pressures depressing
wages and creating unsafe working conditions.'98 The history of
unions in the Russian Federation is completely different: unions
"were created from above as an organic part of the system of
management of society." '" It follows that laws that have evolved
to regulate the relationship between capital and workers in the
West do not transplant easily to a different economic reality. Until
economic relations have developed to the point where workers see
clearly their interests separate from capital, the new labor laws will
most likely go unused.
In addition to economic progress, social attitudes and
194 See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
195 See Great Lakes Pilots, Inc., 311 N.L.R.B. 131, 131-32 (May 21, 1993).
196 See Ilyin, supra note 60, at 106. "Thus the common interest of the owners of the
enterprise and of its workers, some of whom own a miserly number of shares, prevails
over their opposition." Id.
197 See id. at 65-66.
198 See id.
i9 Id. at 67; see supra notes 47-55 and accompanying text.
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expectations must accompany the structural changes in the
economy. Even though workers' rights were undervalued under
the Soviet system, the State ideology influenced the self-
identification of workers and elevated the status of work in Soviet
society.2 °0 Just as the Marxist-Leninist ideologies legitimized the
status quo, and were "apparent in the real, daily life of the
industrial enterprise worker," the "status of the worker is
changing, as a new ideology is created."2°' The Russian Federation
is in a unique position to develop a free market centered on
employee ownership and worker democratic control. A new model
of an economy built on employee owned enterprises might
resemble what Marx and Lenin had in mind before Stalin
intervened. A state where workers hold controlling interest in
enterprises and where management is accountable to employees as
stockholders would offer a different approach to the free market.
This approach would minimize the need for laws regulating labor
conflict and would render the ILO model ineffectual. Therefore the
economy could develop along a route guided by employee
ownership and the new labor laws would be inapplicable, or the
economy could develop into a Western model premised on labor
conflict, and the new labor laws would. apply sometime in the
distant future. Regardless, the recent labor laws do not match the
current economic reality in Russia.
Before there is clear economic development, stable political
leadership is needed to chart the course to the future. Until there is
political resolve to empower management and workers and to
accept the benefits and detriments of capitalism, the passage of
202liberal labor legislation will be ineffective. Even if political and
200 See Kozina & Borisov, supra note 190, at 151-52. "The worker really believed
himself to be an owner." Id. at 152.
201 Id.
202 Why has Russia been unable-to build the legal and financial infrastructure
of a market economy? Current political instability shows that the population is
deeply divided on the desirable features of a future economy. Moreover, Russia
needs an immense structural adjustment if it wants to find a new role in the
world economy. At the time of the collapse of the former Soviet Union,
economic structures were deeply distorted. Moscow's ministries had
deliberately fragmented production processes to assure their key role in
coordination. Implicit taxes and subsidies confronted decision-makers with the
wrong costs and prices. Thus, when Russia opened to the world market, most
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economic stability is established, meaningful labor relations
governed by law will not become a reality until the "rule of law" is
respected in Russia.
To establish the rule of law some basic changes must occur,
including the effective separation of the judiciary from political
parties and the executive branch. A judiciary separate from
political parties and branches of government is required to make
law something more than a coercive instrument. A functional
market requires a legal system that is coercive enough to regulate
inappropriate behavior and free enough to allow economic actors
to follow their self interest. Law in a market society serves as a
legitimator, a regulator, and a facilitator.23 Law is a legitimating
force by preserving the political and economic system,
maintaining public order, and regulating the transfer of political
power.2 4 Law serves the public interest as a regulator when it
corrects for "market failures" and sets minimum standards for
wages, health and safety, protecting those with less bargaining
power.2"5 The market is facilitated by the law when law protects
freedom of contract, prevents fraud and anti-competitive behavior,
and provides an accessible and workable dispute resolution
mechanism.
2 6
To serve its function in the market, law must effectively
resolve disputes and enforce remedies for those who have legal
interests that have been violated. The courts must be willing to
enforce effective remedies to labor violations. In the United
States, most unfair labor practices are remedied by injunctions to
cease unfair practices, to exclude unions from private property, or
to protect free speech. Because Russia is basically a civil law
country, their labor law lacks many equitable remedies common in
the United States, such as injunctions to bargain or orders to cease
and desist an unfair labor practice. When an employer refuses to
workers were in the wrong places doing the wrong things. These workers [are]
still in the same position today.
Judith Thornton, Economic Reform and Economic Reality, 28 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 847,
861 (1995).
203 See TRYfNG TO MAKE LAW MATTER, supra note 30, at 13.
204 See id. at 12.
205 See id.
206 See id. at 12-13.
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bargain with the union, the employer is subject to a fine rather than
an injunction order to bargain."7 Limiting remedies to money
damages is often ineffective in the labor context where the law
must be able to prevent acts before they result in economic
damage.
Furthermore, the enforcement of effective remedies also
requires the "existence of an independent legal profession" who
can act as "facilitators" and "gatekeepers" so that "access to the
legal system can be effectively denied to those . . .whose legal
claims are considered weak." 20 Law that facilitates market activity
and checks government action helps legitimate the State as whole.
Moreover, the development of the "rule of law" means that
particular ideological positions must be subservient to the
Constitution. Oliver Wendell Holmes described the problem thus:
The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert
Spencer's Social Statistics .... Some of these laws embody
convictions or prejudices which judges are likely to share. Some
may not. But a constitution is not intended to embody a
particular economic theory, whether of paternalism and the
organic relation of the citizen to the State or of laissez faire. It
is made for people of fundamentally differing views, and the
accident of our finding certain opinions natural and familiar or
novel, and even shocking ought not to conclude our judgement
upon the question whether statutes embodying them conflict
with the Constitution of the United States.2°9
Therefore, Russia must begin to develop a constitutional
culture which looks to "higher principles" to justify the legitimacy
of laws and official acts. Accompanying the constitutional culture,
there must also be a market culture. Replacing the hand of the
State with the "invisible hand" of the market will require the
development of a whole set of social and legal expectations that
govern the market place.
207 See RF CBA Act, supra note 172, art. 25. Employers who evade bargaining on
matters listed in the act or failing to meet deadlines "shall be liable to fines in the
amount of up to ten times the minimum pay for each day after the expiration of the
specified period, to be imposed in judicial procedure." Id. The fine for failure to comply
with a collective contract is one hundred times the minimum pay. See id. art. 26.
208 Id. at 16.
209 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75-76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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Hence, due to the existing state of the legal infrastructure and
the chaotic economic situation, the new labor legislation appears
idealistic at best. Until a consistent model of labor relations
emerges from a stable economic structure, the labor law is likely
to be ineffective and even detrimental to development." °
C. SCOTT HOLMES
210 For additional information on this subject, see Michelle Lynn McClure, An
Analysis of the New Russian Constitution, 4 J. INT'L L. & PRAC. 601 (1995); see also
ANATOLY M. KHAZANOV, AFTER THE USSR: ETHNICITY, NATIONALISM, AND POLITICS IN
THE COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES (1995); Veroniak Kabalina, Privitisation
and Restructuring of Enterprises: Under 'Insider' or 'Outsider' Control?, in CONFLICT
AND CHANGE IN THE RUSSIAN INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE 241 (1996); Irina Tartakovskaya,
The Trade Union 'Solidarity '-=A Case Study, in CONFLICT AND CHANGE IN THE RUSSIAN
INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE 107 (1996); John Thirkell et al., Models of Labour Relations:
Trends and Prospects, in LABOR RELATIONS & POLITICAL CHANGE IN EASTERN EUROPE:
A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 169 (John Thirkell et al. eds., 1995); Antti Korkeakiv, The
Reach of Rights in the New Russian Constitution, 3 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 229
(1995); Ninel S. Krylova, The New Constitution of Russia: Main Principles and
Features, 27 AKRON L. REV. 397 (1994); Daniel McGrory, Civilizing the Russian
Underground Economy: Requirements and Prospects, 5 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 65 (1995); Herman Schwartz, Do Economic and Social Rights Belong in a
Constitution?, 10 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1233 (1995).
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